Generating value: real optionality in the EdF take-over of British Energy by Haar, Lawrence & Haar, Laura
38 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL FEBRUARY 2009
POWER MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
those of previous generations because
of the role to be played by the private
sector capital. Historically, nuclear
power plants were state-owned enter-
prises, but concern over public
finances has led to a business model in
which new power stations would be
financed and built through private ini-
tiatives. Once viewed as a business in a
twilight sector to be managed down,
British Energy (BE), the largely pri-
vately owned enterprise operating
eight of the UK’s nuclear fleet, as well
as a large coal-fired power station, is
now the repository of hope for the
country’s nuclear revival. This revival,
however, has only been made possible
through the attraction of inward
investment by the multi-national
The resurgence of interest innuclear energy in the UKsince the new millenniumhas been nothing short of
remarkable. At the end of the last centu-
ry the prevailing orthodoxy among
industry experts, policymakers and aca-
demics was that no new plants would be
built and that existing ones would be
retired, often in advance of their useful
lives. Since thenacombinationof factors,
including volatile and rising hydrocarbon
prices, energy security, the desire to
reduce greenhouse gases, and supportive
governmentpolicies, have together creat-
ed a business environment favourable
and conducive to new investment in
nuclear generation.
Today’s plans differ decisively from
power company EDF, owner and
operator of the world’s largest nuclear
fleet. Through competitive negotia-
tions with both shareholders and the
British government, EDF beat several
competitors to cement its place in the
UK’s nuclear energy revival.
Below we examine the decision
making of EDF from a financial per-
spective. Although EDF sells power
across some connectors into adjacent
countries such Spain and Germany
and via the sub-sea interconnector to
the UK, undertaking a £12.5 billion
acquisition programme ($23 billion
when EDF’s offer was accepted in
September 2008) across borders was
without precedent for the group. With
life spans reaching half-a-century, the
evaluation of nuclear investments pre-
sents a myriad of conceptual chal-
lenges which we have found cannot be
adequately assessed using traditional
financial analysis. In contrast, we
show that by enhancing traditional
financial analysis with Real Option
Theory, the value arising from flexibil-
ity of an investment, such as the right
to expand, the right to delay, the
choice of technology the compelling
logic of the EDF takeover begins to
make sense.
HISTORY OF BRITISH ENERGY
To understand the logic behind the
EDF decision to enter the UK nuclear
generation market through the BE
takeover it is helpful to remember the
history. As we show below, although
BE had been through some very diffi-
cult times, post restructuring it had
been transformed into a viable enter-
prise, albeit one with a limited longevi-
ty. To recall, the United Kingdom was
a global leader in the liberalisation
and privatisation of energy markets,
by which we mean the supply, genera-
tion, distribution andmarketing of gas
and electricity to consumers, business
and commercial enterprises and
industry. Achieving these objectives
with a privatised industry which
would use competition to “regulate”
Earlier this year, EDF’s long-awaited acquisition of the British Energy was
completed. But what was the company’s rationale behind the £12.5 billion
takeover of the UK nuclear generator? By Lawrence Haar and Laura Haar
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the market and create sufficient incen-
tives for investment was envisioned
under the Electricity Act of 1989.
Industry restructuring went hand-in-
hand with privatisation and market
mechanisms it was hoped would
replace the heavy hand of regulation
to achieve such objectives as competi-
tive prices, adequate returns to
investors, and direction of capital to
new investments. The pace of deregu-
lation and privatisation culminated
in the New Electricity Trading
Arrangement (NETA) of 2001.
Where power had been previously
sold into a central purchasing
arrangement or “the pool”, it was
replaced with a traded market relying
upon exchanges and over-the-counter
activity. By the first years of the new
millennium, the combination of new
entrants, deregulation of prices, cus-
tomer switching, and falling input
prices for gas and coal, had driven
power prices at times below average
variable costs. These low prices for
power and poor returns forced many
new entrants who were purely mer-
chant traders in the market, ie without
established customers and contracts,
to exit the market. Market consolida-
tion ensued as distressed assets were
acquired by incumbents.
How did British Energy fare under
these circumstances? Not well. With
competition driving prices below
average variable costs made it impos-
sible for nuclear energy, with a large
capital base, to earn an adequate
return or even service its debt. More-
over the creation of a traded market
power with prices at peak half-hours
many multiples of those at off-peak
hours, lent itself to plants which could
easily cycle on and off, like gas tur-
bines, to capture the best prices.
Nuclear stations are by comparison
inflexible in their operating regime,
ideally only shutting down for sched-
uled maintenance. In addition to
the new pricing regime for power
creating challenges, the inadvertent
consequences of deregulation and
privatisation made matters worse.
The legacies of privatisation and
deregulation are among the reasons it
was believed that nuclear energy no
longer suited market realities.
Deregulation and privatisation had,
by the 1990s, left the UK with a verti-
cally integrated, concentrated market
structure resembling an oligopoly like
much of Europe, where the bulk of
generation resides in the hands of four
key players. In the UK, the original
and widely agreed requirements for a
competitive and traded power market
– the separation of generation from
distribution and supply to ensure
unrestricted third-party access – have
all fallen away. The competitive mar-
ket structure and behaviour following
privatisation and deregulation drove
prices below average variable cost,
placing high cost operators with limit-
ed operational flexibility at a disad-
vantage. A deregulated and privatised
market without a requirement to take
nuclear power (as is in the case of so-
called green energy) was not suited for
nuclear energy, which relies upon suf-
ficiently high average prices across a
long timeframe to amortise capital.
Three factors rendered the situation of
BE acute:
• Poor reliability leading to
unplanned outages and lower
output and revenue.
• The failure of the negotiations with
British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), to
reach agreement on the terms of
fuel contracts.
• A general review by the board of
British Energy on the long-term
prospects of the group.
It was under such circumstances that
by 2002 British Energy faced bank-
ruptcy and requested government
intervention in the form of various
credit facilities, protection from credi-
tors, which ultimately led to financial
restructuring, the sale of assets, and
the exchange of private equity and
debt for partial public ownership.
Post restructuring and in advance of
EDF involvement the fortunes of BE
had improved markedly. The restruc-
tured and recapitalised BE also
enjoyed a more favourable business
climate. The exiting of the many mer-
chant generators from the market,
general consolidation as noted above,
higher natural gas costs as marginal
generators leading to higher power
prices, and lastly the ratcheting of
power prices through the Emissions
Trading Scheme together supported
higher prices for power fromwhich the
generator BE profited. The share
price, as shown in Figure 1 reflected
the improved circumstances. From
pence a share when the company was
facing bankruptcy, the share price had
risen sharply reflecting the new capital
structure, more favourable trading
conditions, and more recently the
group’s value from an acquisition
standpoint. As of December 2008,
shares of BE were trading at a very
respectable 27 times earnings and the
market capitalisation had risen to
nearly £7.8 billion.
Post reorganisation we also see a sta-
bilisation of revenues. Turnover sta-
bilised (see Figure 2), increasing by
approximately 4.7% between 2006
and 2007. Altogether a dramatic shift
in circumstances for a group which
had once been written-off by much of
the financial press as congenitally dis-
posed to failure and unlikely to ever
succeed given its poor mix of inflexible
assets with a small customer base and
management.
THE TAKEOVER
From a step-child of energy sector pri-
vatisation to the forced restructuring
ending in 2005, the appeal of BE as
an acquisition candidate and vehicle
Table 1: British Energy’s fleet
Name Type Net capacity Planned
(MWe) decommissioning
date
Hartlepool AGR 1190 2014
Heysham 1 AGR 1160 2014
Hinkley Point AGR 860 2016
Hunterston B AGR 840 2016
Dungeness AGR 1090 2018
Heysham 2 AGR 1230 2023
Torness AGR 1250 2023
Eggborough Coal 1960 2035
Sizewell B PWR 1188 2035
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Figure 3: British Energy’s projected future capacity (assuming no new reactors or plant life extensions)
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ditionally divest either the Dungeness
or Heysham potential new build site,
and to end one of its three grid con-
nection agreements at Hinkley Point in
order to facilitate the entry of other
potential new generators into the UK
nuclear industry. It is also in the
process of auctioning its land next to
the Wylfa nuclear site, which is being
marketed simultaneously with the
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
(see NEIDecember 2008, p12).
The restructuring of BE coupled
with the general revival of nuclear as
a safe, reliable, environmentally-
friendly alternative to gas and coal
fired power stations laid the ground-
work for the EDF acquisition, thereby
combining the forces, skills, and
expertise of the two groups. EDF was
not acquiring the heavily discounted
remains of the UK nuclear sector but
rather a going-concern for which it
paid a premium price.
TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL LOGIC
To understand the logic behind the
EDF takeover of BE we begin by con-
sidering the economic and financial
logic behind this massive deal.
Economic and financial gains from
acquisitions typically involve the fol-
lowing aspects:
• Vertical & horizontal economies of
scale;
• Enhancement of market power;
• Managerial improvements;
• Financing gains, ie reduced cost of
capital.
Incorporating new assets or businesses
into existing business activities, for
example in an acquisition or merger,
may only be value creating if some-
how, the combined assets are together
worth more than they were as separate
entities, prior to the change in control.
If the assets and business of BE are
correctly priced at £12.5 billion why
and how are they worth more in the
hands of EDF? Remember, if none of
these gains transpire, the acquisition of
BE by the French group will have a net
present value (NPV) of zero. Unless
through such synergies, economies of
scale, marketing advantages or better
management, the assets are worth
more, over time, to the buyer than they
are in the market, no benefits will arise
from the acquisition.
Existing assets
Applying the above principles we look
at the economic and financial merits
of the existing BE fleet and whether
the sources of potential synergies
with which to promote the revival of
nuclear energy began in 2007 and
gathered pace over the course of 2008
with the public policy agenda around
clean, reliable, and low-carbon energy
providing wind to the sails.
By the autumn of 2008 and after
two rejected takeover bids, an agree-
ment between the UK government,
EDF, and the nuclear licensing
authority had been reached. EDF’s
cash offer of 774 pence for each
British Energy share had been accept-
ed by the BE Board (see NEI Novem-
ber 2008, p5). The transaction,
according to the respective Boards,
would result in increased output from
BE’s existing nuclear power stations,
higher output resulting from plant life
extensions, as well as opportunities for
investment in new nuclear build. The
variability of power prices under lib-
eralised markets as found in the UK
and adjacent countries, not guaran-
teeing a return to existing and
planned assets, were noted as risk fac-
tors facing existing shareholders in
contemplating the EDF offer.
As part of the transaction the
French group acquired a number of
nuclear sites, suitable for the construc-
tion of four new reactors. This was
marked as an area of concern by the
European Commission when consid-
ering the proposed sale under Euro-
pean Union merger regulations and it
imposed certain conditions on the
transaction. EDF is required to uncon-
noted above might apply. BE owns
and operates eight nuclear power sta-
tions (14 AGR units at seven sites, and
the country’s only PWR at Sizewell).
In addition, it owns and runs a coal-
fired power station, Eggborough. The
nuclear stations have a combined
capacity of almost 9000MWe, whilst
the coal-fired plant adds a further
1960MWe of output (see Table 1).
Putting together the combined
capacity for the BE fleet we see in Fig-
ure 3 that capacity drops off sharply
after 2020. Unless plant life exten-
sions were to take place, the entire
British Energy fleet of power stations
ends its useful economic life by 2035.
Given the available capacity of BE
and its likely power output into the
future we can compare the projected
revenue and income stream from
these plants against the £12.5 billion
EDF paid. In this way we can address
if the expenditure made sense and if
not, how else might have EDF justi-
fied this massive foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) into the UK nuclear
energy future.
We have created some likely net
profitability scenarios as would result
from BE’s existing assets. Using the
latest and stable published financials
for EDF as assumptions, we can con-
sider first whether present power
prices for electricity would justify the
takeover of this UK company, fol-
lowed by the question of how high
prices for power would need to make
the existing assets provide adequate
return to this massive FDI step. Using
the published financial data for EDF
(see Table 2) in order for value to be
created in the BE acquisition the
returns would need to beat the weight-
ed average cost of capital (WACC) of
12%. Unless new capital is deployed
at a return greater than that already
deployed, value would be destroyed –
unless of course other advantage or
gains might arise from the transaction.
Data from the European Energy
Exchange has shown that the average
price for power sold in 2008 was
54.40r/MWh. Following accepted
financial practices for projecting rev-
enues beyond traded markets, EDF
would have used the latest prices
adjusted with an assumption for
inflation escalation. Using the latest
financial results for the French group
for cost of sales and general adminis-
tration expenses, and holding cost
relationships static, we compute the
performance shown in Table 3.
Escalating from a base of 2008
power prices, we see that unless the
rate of price appreciation exceeds 3%
Table 3: Alternative price trajectory
scenarios
Rate of annual Net present IRR* (%)
power price value (v)
appreciation (%)
0 -1,465,796,839 n/a
1 -937,741,747 n/a
2 -349,266,518 n/a
3 309,363,646 12.38
4 1,049,773,811 13.34
5 1,885,887,203 14.32
* Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the discount rate applied to future cash
flows which render them equal to initial expenditure. IRR on a negative
NPV is not meaningful and hence not displayed.
Table 2: EDF financials
Cost of equity 19%
Cost of debt 5%
Debt to equity ratio 1.02
Weighted average 12%
cost of capital
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or more, the NPV is negative and the
IRR is below the WACC of 12%
and hence the acquisition is not value
creating. Only at an unrealistic 3%
annual growth rate in real prices does
the internal rate of return start to beat
the cost of capital, creating value. If,
as most firms, EDF has a target closer
to 20% return before tax on its invest-
ments this takeover would not make
sense, at least in terms of the existing
business and assets. As we discovered
through analysis, according to the
model results, power prices would
need to be aroundr63/MWh or 17%
above present prices to yield returns
on the investment (see Table 4).
Interpreting these results in light of
the circumstances of the acquisition, it
appears that nearly r7.5 billion in
additional value would need to result
from such gains as noted earlier. Is
this reasonable? There may be the
economies of scale, there may be cost
savings through having the British
Energy plants managed by EDF and
perhaps the French can offer better
management than its British counter-
part, but even so, it can be the source
of r5 billion of additional value from
the existing assets? How about mar-
keting gains? Energy markets are
competitive and the largest customers
switch suppliers readily, together sug-
gesting that keener pricing or lower
costs are together an unlikely source of
billions of euros in gains and savings
to the acquirer EDF. As one commen-
tator remarked, “For the full payout of
575 pence [per share] power prices
would need to average more than £90
pounds per megawatt hour with the
plants producing 65 terawatt-hours a
year…” this is a gamble. Explaining
this transaction is not easy but let’s
think of other reasons for why it may
make financial sense.
REAL OPTIONALITY APPROACH
Real option theory is the application of
option pricing techniques to corporate
finance, in particular to capital budget-
ing and investment decisions made by
firms. They are called real options, as
they are not traded on any exchange
like those in, say, oil or gold. Real
option refers to the notion of flexibility,
and hence the option to make new
decisions or amend earlier ones in light
of changing and volatile conditions.
Some examples of real-optionality
include whether to:
• expand current operations;
• contract out production;
• temporarily shut down;
• default on obligations or contracts;
• abandon a project.
These are all forms of real optionality
implicit to managerial decision mak-
ing. A modified NPV taking into
account real optionality would mean
accept project or undertake investment
if conventional NPV + option value is
greater than zero.
Thus we propose to augment the
NPV analysis as performed above
where we saw that justifying the EDF
takeover of BE as problematic by
including the value of any embedded
real optionality. Critically real options
help us to quantify the value of man-
agerial flexibility. If the NPV of a
project is already positive for some
additional value in real optionality
will not be necessary from a project
justification stand-point. Flexibility in
the use of assets can be a source of
value because they allow the owner to
respond to changing conditions and
opportunities. Real optionality is
useful when complex multi-phase
projects are undertaken and when
decisions may be made over time, as
applies in this case. As we can see, ex
ante looking for real options encour-
ages managers to look for flexible
value creating opportunities, especial-
ly ones which open the door to follow-
on situations. Real optionality can be
a key source of additional value as
may arise during an acquisition.
Below we explore their potential rele-
vance to explaining decisions such as
the EDF takeover of EDF
Above we have seen that the tradi-
tional economic and financial argu-
ments are unable to make a persuasive
case for why EDF launched this mas-
sive FDI into the UK nuclear sector.
As an FDI advantage the ownership of
the existing BE assets do not appear to
make lots of sense. It has been suggest-
ed that this FDImight be justified from
a location perspective but this has yet
to be quantified. Below we consider
what additional flexibility or real-
optionality exists for EDF in the
takeover of BE.
Reviewing the typology of real-
optionality, the one that figures strong-
ly in this FDI transaction is ‘the option
to expand.’ As stated, the principle
appeal of British Energy is that it
affords sites and access to sites on
which new nuclear plants may be con-
structed. This is considered in more
detail below.
Option to expand
The payoff from an option to expand
has one of two alternative values or
outcomes. Purchasing BE gives EDF
the opportunity, but not the obliga-
tion, to expand the nuclear generation
fleet on its newly acquired sites (sub-
ject to regulatory approval including
the EPR passing the generic design
assessment).
Howmuchmight the opportunity to
build four new nuclear plants be worth
the EDF? According to reports, EDF
plans to build four 1600MWe EPRs in
the UK at an estimated cost of r6.25
billion per reactor. It aims to complete
construction on the first EPR by
Christmas 2017, with the other three
reactors coming online in 2020, 2022
and 2025, respectively.
To quantify the option to expand –
that is to build four new plants with
combined generating capacity of
6400MWe on the BE sites – we have
modified the previous financial-eco-
nomic model. The nominal cash flows
appear in Figure 4 and the perfor-
mance results appear in Table 5.
Here we see that building the four
new plants, unlike the existing fleet,
has a positive net present value.
Furthermore we see that the results
8
6
4
2
0
-2
2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2046
C
as
h
flo
w
(b
ill
io
n
u
)
Revenues new build
Operating profit
Amortisation of plants capex
Operating profit net of amortisation
Figure 4: New plant cash flows
Table 4: Financial comparisons
Metrics Results (v)
NPV at 53.40v/MWh -346,438,487
NPV at 63.00v/MWh 7,089,257,994
Additional value 7,435,696,481
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are very sensitive to the growth rate in
power prices. At flat 0% growth in
prices the NPV is r96 million and the
IRR is 15%, while if prices grow a
mere 1% annually the NPV jumps to
over r500 million with an IRR of
36%. At higher rates of growth in
prices returns are exceptional, though
probably less realistic. The point is
that prices and hence revenues are
volatile and may be a source of addi-
tional option value in this expansion.
Also note that the recovery of capi-
tal, payback on a non-discounted time
value basis, is less than twenty years.
Other key assumptions made in this
analysis were:
• Cost structure: cost of sales, general
administration costs and expenses
were based on BE’s 2008 perfor-
mance.
• Availability and reliability was
based on the current operating
availability of EDF’s French fleet
(83% average over the given year).
If EDF were to improve upon either
of these key assumptions then there
would be further upside to the returns
presented in Table 5. Although
putting faith in greater reliability or
cost savings might be reasonable, hop-
ing that greater market share can be
translated into keener prices is proba-
bly the least likely.
Other options
The second form of real optionality,
the option to contract out relates to
disposing of the Eggborough coal-
fired power station. Although its sale,
is stipulated in the purchase agree-
ment with the British government,
how this may be undertaken has flexi-
bility or optionality and may be an
additional source of value. EDF may
even consider some form of option to
contract out with regard to the
Eggborough plant. Furthermore the
existing plant of BEmay be temporar-
ily or even permanently shutdown,
again affording yet greater value
through real optionality.
Similarly, the stipulation that inter-
ests in 25% of the BE plants should be
sold to a domestic entity, namely
Centrica, creates lots of scope for
alternative arrangements, affording
additional optionality. According to
reports and coverage, Centrica will
take a 25% of all power generated by
BE, once it is owned by EDF, and a
25% stake in new nuclear generators
built by the French company. The cost
to Centrica will be about £3 billion.
Exactly how this will be organized
between the French utility and Centri-
ca has not yet been made public and
indeed is likely under negotiation at
the time of this research. Although
attempting to quantify the value of
such arrangements would be difficult,
the right to enter into a production
sharing arrangement with this smaller
UK group, which has been mis-
matched between its customers and its
supplies business since conception,
does present further flexibility or real-
optionality to EDF. It is easy to believe
that the French group will have a
strong hand in any negotiations and
arrangements may favour the larger
player, EDF.
LOTS OF OPTIONS
In this article we have examined the
entry of EDF into the UK nuclear
power industry through the acquisi-
tion of the once-troubled British
Energy Group. We have shown that
the economics of the existing plant,
on a narrow financial basis is not very
good. One would have to see very
large and sustained increases in real
prices for power for the economics of
the existing BE fleet to generate a pos-
itive net present value, given the some
£12 billion which EDF paid, or for
the existing cost structures or reliabili-
ty to improve dramatically, albeit
unrealistically. Having shown that the
economics of the existing BE could
not have justified this massive cross-
boarder acquisition, we turned to the
concept of real-optionality to repre-
sent the flexibility which the acquisi-
tion offers to the French group. We
find that presented in this manner,
there is a very strong case for spending
over £12 billion because the acquisi-
tion through the various sites, creates a
massive option to expand. Although
under traditional financial-economic
cash flow analysis the merits of the
transaction are challenging, finding
the real-optionality provides fresh
insights on how and why this massive
FDI makes sense for EDF. Additional
optionality as may arise through con-
tracting out production to Centrica
may yet even further value production
in this multi-national transaction.
Additional option value in the transac-
tion might even result through swap-
ping nuclear off-take with flexible gas
turbine generated power. Altogether,
in taking over British Energy, EDF has
lots of options.
Dr Lawrence Haar is an MD for Commodity Risk with Credit
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Table 5: Metrics
Annual percentage growth real prices
0% 1% 2% 3%
CAPEX on 4 plants (v) 25,000,000,000 25,000,000,000 25,000,000,000 25,000,000,000
PV of CAPEX on 4 plants (v) 7,028,899,898 7,028,899,898 7,028,899,898 7,028,899,898
Payback (year) 2034 2033 2032 2031
NPV, 20 year amortisation (v) 96,049,955 551,274,122 1,112,507,986 1,808,293,955
Internal rate of return (%) 15% 36% 78% 266%
Sizewell B, the UK’s only PWR
